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Introduction 
 
In the MENA region, the idea of regional Arab integration started more than 60 years ago 
without real achievements until 1998, when the foundations of the Great Arab Free Trade 
Area (GAFTA) were settled. Nevertheless, the agreement represents only a shallow 
integration, and the low levels of MENA countries' intra-regional trade will not enhance 
the expected dynamic effects of this integration.  
 
Within the region, the countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) represent a 
unique case of advanced deep cooperation, committed to enhance their economic 
integration, moving from a free trade area in 1981, to a full customs union by the end of 
2005. The announcement of the creation of a common currency by 2010 reflects the real 
engagement to achieve an economic union among the six countries.  
 
This experience might become the heart of a larger Arab movement towards real deep 
integration. Therefore, the success of the project has to be ensured and enhanced, 
basically through robust and committed research on its feasibility.  
 
The aim of our paper is to investigate on the monetary policy coordination among the 
GCC countries that is required to make the common currency a success and to allow all 
its members to take full benefit of it. For the purpose of our investigation, we are going to 
call the new currency the Gulf Currency (GC). 
 
The paper will be organized as follow: in the first section we will present the theoretical 
basis of a monetary union with a summary of the existing literature on the regions 
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experience, including a brief overview of exchange rates in the GCC countries. In the 
second section, we present the model that we use to illustrate the impact of the major 
variables on the real exchange rate behavior in each country and the appropriateness of 
the Engle-Granger « two steps single equation cointegration » approach, applied on 
developing countries by Ibrahim Elbadawi (1994 & 1997). In the third section, we 
present our econometric test and expose its results, and in the last section we conclude 
and draw some policy implications. 
  
1- Overview of currency unions 
 
Regional economic integration has been a notable trend in the global economy in recent 
years. Several levels of regional economic integration are possible. From least integrated 
to most integrated, they are a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an 
economic union, and, finally, a full political union.  
 
Economic theories of international trade predict that unrestricted free trade will allow 
countries to specialize in the production of goods and services that they can produce most 
efficiently. Also, opening a country to free trade stimulates economic growth in the 
country, and creates dynamic gains from foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, through 
the transfer of technological, marketing, and managerial know-how to host nations. 
Therefore, a growing number of countries are moving toward regional integration at 
different levels, like the EU, the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR, and the ASEAN, among 
others.  
 
Nevertheless, regional integration leads to increasing interdependence of the partners' 
economies. The deeper the integration, the higher would be that interdependence. This is 
one of the main reasons for crisis contagion, as observed in many cases, like in the 
European Union in 1992, Latin America in 1994, and South East Asia in 1997. Therefore, 
the members of a regional partnership should start working on exchange rate policy 
coordination projects, in order to avoid or at least limit the risks of exchange rate crisis, 
where the most advanced example of such a project is the Euro common currency.  
 
The literature on common currencies is relatively recent, initiated by Robert Mundell in 
the 50s who presented different steps of monetary cooperation, starting with Currency 
Areas where currencies are freely exchanged at a constant rate, to Monetary Union in 
which there is one currency and one exchange rate vis-à-vis the outside world, unification 
of monetary markets, and free movement of currencies and deposits at constant rates, 
which is also called an Optimum Currency Area (OCA).  
 
The monetary union involves not only a unified currency among member states, but also 
common monetary and banking policies, a pool of foreign exchange reserves dealt with 
by one central bank, financial market integration (liberal capital transactions, 
harmonization of national financial regulations, structures and institutions) and 
reasonable economic convergence.  
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The only successful example of monetary union is the Euro area that came into effect in 
2002. Nevertheless, the process to create the Euro was long (started in 1970 with the 
Werner Report), and not without turmoil, like we noticed during the 1992 crisis. To cope 
with the crisis and pursue the common currency objective, the EU countries had to 
establish strict rules to be followed and accomplished by the countries willing to join the 
common currency, known as the Maastricht convergence criteria, and reinforced by the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth pact in 1998. Still, when the Euro was 
launched, the EU did not have yet the required criteria suggested by OCA theory, but it is 
recognized that the launch of the Euro enhanced the European integration.  
 
The MERCOSUR agreement ratified in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, had the objective of creating a common currency, after a period of 
macroeconomic policies' harmonization. However, none of the options has proven 
politically feasible as of yet. Moreover, the lack of real exchange rate and 
macroeconomic policies coordination has led to a sharp Argentinean crisis in 2001, 
accentuated by the Brazilian devaluation. This example illustrates how essential the 
exchange rate and macroeconomic policy cooperation becomes within any regional 
integration framework.  
 
For these reasons, the ASEAN member countries have included the macroeconomic 
policy coordination on their agenda since the crisis in 1997, and established as well an 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, including Japan, China and Korea, in November 
1999. Moreover, the Japanese Vice-Minister of Finance advanced a proposal for an Asian 
monetary fund in 1997, but the idea was strongly opposed by the United States and the 
IMF, and subsequently abandoned.  
 
On May 6, 2000, the Finance Ministers of 12 countries signed a multilateral financial 
cooperation agreement called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The principal tools, on 
which the agreement relies, are the ASEAN Swap Arrangement, the Bilateral Swap 
Arrangements and the Repo Arrangements. This network of swap agreements is designed 
to provide immediate liquidity support for any member country that experiences short-
run balance of payment deficits, in order to prevent a systemic failure and subsequent 
regional contagion.  
 
A later proposal, which remains on the drawing board, is the Asian Monetary System 
(AMS), reviving the Asian monetary fund idea. The main features of such an 
arrangement would be some version of bilaterally fixed but adjustable exchange rates, 
with adjustments (realignments) decided on jointly, flexible arrangements with respect to 
convertibility and capital controls, and an Asian monetary fund to support the currency 
band system.  
 
Literature review on the GCC Monetary Union  
 
The recent economic literature provides only a few researches oriented towards the 
analysis of the perspective GC. The study by Laabas and Limam (2002) addresses the 
question whether the GCC represents the characteristics of an Optimum Currency Area. 
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The authors apply a Generalized Purchasing Power Parity test that shows that the GCC 
real exchange rates are closely related and share the same stochastic trend. The authors 
argue that once the GC is established, it could expand intra-industry trade despite the 
present lack of diversification. Finally, they conclude that the GC will lead to more 
convergence in economic structures and economic policies and synchronized business 
cycles.  
 
Another relevant research on the subject is the paper presented by Ibrahim Badr-El-Din 
(2004), who identifies some potential costs and benefits of the Monetary Union among 
the GCC countries. He applies for his investigation the five tests that are guiding the UK 
policy decision on joining a Monetary Union - convergence, flexibility, investment, 
financial services and growth, stability and employment. The author concludes that the 
structural convergence does not seem to be an impediment to create, sustain and benefit 
from the GC. He argues that the fiscal policies remain the least coordinated. The high 
contribution of oil and gas to total government revenues severely affects budget balances 
via oil price volatility, leading to the variation of the level of deficits and surplus and 
public debts among countries. He argues as well that there might not be a notable 
increase in the dynamic effects in terms of FDI inflows, and concludes that the GCC 
countries will incur some costs of having a joint Monetary Union, with less significant 
potential economic benefits.  
 
Two more papers, written by IMF experts, on the potential gains of the GC and its 
appropriate exchange rate policy seemed highly interesting for our study. Jadresic (2002) 
concludes that a properly implemented currency union may contribute to enhance 
economic efficiency in the GCC region, deepen regional integration and develop its non-
oil economy. However, it cautions that a currency union should be seen as only one 
component of a much broader integration effort.  
 
Abed, Erbas and Guerami (2003) investigate on the appropriate exchange rate regime, 
and on the choice for the GC to be pegged to the US dollar or to a basket of both dollar 
and Euro. They conclude that a peg to the dollar leads to a similar impact on economic 
stability as a peg to a basket would, and therefore there is no need to change the already 
existing practices of pegging to the dollar, since the GCC economies are heavily 
dependent on oil production. The authors argue as well that the more diversified these 
economies become, the more flexible their exchange rate shall be, and then a basket 
would be required for transition. 
 
Nevertheless, the choice of a fixed exchange rate seems too risky from our point of view. 
The recent exchange rate crises in Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Turkey and 
Egypt have proven that fixed exchange rates are unsustainable in the growing financial 
globalization context. The globalization of free capital flows leads to balance of payment 
crises and exchange rate fluctuations. Rapid financial market liberalization in emerging 
markets can lead to banking crises, usually followed by exchange rate crises.  
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On the other side, free float makes economies subject to higher fluctuations. Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000) demonstrate that most of the emerging market countries with rates 
described as floating had more volatility than the fixed-rate ones.  
 
Taking into account the relative scarcity of the researches on the subject, we believe that 
there is reasonable scope for both qualitative and quantitative investigations into the 
perspectives for a common Gulf currency. Instead of applying the usual tests on whether 
the GCC is an Optimum Currency Area or not, or just addressing the costs and benefits of 
the GC, we would rather investigate on the appropriate policy harmonization that has to 
accompany the common currency for it to succeed fully. 
 
Exchange rate policy evolution and classification in the GCC countries        
 
Since the beginning of the Bretton Woods system, the Arab countries witnessed a certain 
will in creating exchange rate policy cooperation, when Twenty-two Arab countries 
planned to launch a united currency called Arab Dinnar in 1945. Sixty years later, only 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Oman, Qatar, the 
UAE and Bahrain  are still pursuing these efforts.  
 
Figure 1: Nominal exchange rates towards the US dollar, 1979-2003. 
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Source: World Bank Data Base and World Markets Research Centre, 2002-2003. 
 
As we can see from the graph, the GCC countries have always guaranteed an important 
stability of their exchange rates. The large oil-export revenues have allowed those 
countries to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserves of around US$50bn in order to 
counter any currency fluctuation1.  
                                                 
1 For example, the constitution of Kuwait stipulates that 10 percent of oil revenues are diverted into a fund 
established to counter balance swings in the volatile business cycle. That fund now stands at around 
US$100bn. The Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) manages at least part of Saudi Arabias net 
foreign assets, estimated at over US$180 billion. 
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On December 31, 2002, Kuwait pegged its currency exclusively to the US dollar, rather 
than to the currency basket it was previously attached to for more than 25 years. The 
other five members of the GCC already tie their currencies to the US dollar. We could 
conclude that the de facto exchange rate policy in these countries is the same as the de 
jure one, namely a fixed exchange rate policy toward a single currency, the US dollar.  
 
2. The Theoretical and Econometric Methodology to Identify Exchange Rate 
Behavior Determinants 
 
Theoretically, real exchange rate behavior is subject to many influences, such as the 
monetary policy, the government expenditure, the terms of trade, the degree of openness 
and the capital flows. In fact, the exchange rate is the heart of the economic activities: it 
affects and is affected by the other policies. That is why a policy coordination and 
harmonization is essential for the success of a common currency.  
 
In this section, we will identify the determinants of the real exchange behavior in each 
country, in order to flesh out the similarities or differences of the impact that each 
determinant has.  
 
The theoretical background 
 
The theoretical basis of our approach relies on the Robert Mundells (1967) economic 
trilemma triangle (Appendix n°1). In our analysis we consider that the three corner points 
of the triangle (A, B and C) are extreme cases, and that in reality a countrys policy mix 
is always somewhere inside the triangle, at least concerning emerging markets 
economies in the actual globalized system2.  
 
Economic theory and practice have proven that exchange rate stability is incompatible 
with an activist monetary policy directed toward output stabilization. As the quantity 
theory of money puts it, the price level is directly related to the stock of money or 
monetary base (Fisher, 1911). Knowing that the real exchange rate is a relationship 
between national and international prices, this implies that any variation in the monetary 
base that induces a price level change different from the international price level change 
will provoke a variation in the real exchange rate. Therefore, we consider the AB side of 
the Trilemma triangle as practically unsustainable in the long run.  
 
The BC side of the triangle implies a complete sacrifice of the monetary policy that can 
no longer be used for any domestic economic purposes such as output or employment 
dynamization. Policy makers are in general rather reluctant to the idea of abandoning one 
of the major tools for economic adjustment to external and internal shocks, not to 
mention the threat for the domestic financial system in the absence of a lender of last 
resort.  
                                                 
2 For more in-depth explanation of the theoretical foundation of our methodology, please refer to Kamar 
and Bakardzhieva (2005). 
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The remaining AC side of the triangle implies a clean float of the exchange rate, which 
means high fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate  the equivalent to high volatility 
of relative prices. This volatility is costly either directly, or because it provokes output 
fluctuations and damages the financial systems health (Velasco, 2000). In order to 
mitigate this volatility the policymakers practice floating with varying degrees of 
management. Even the US, usually regarded as the cleanest of floaters, intervenes 
occasionally in the foreign exchange market. 
 
Within this configuration, we introduce the intermediate exchange rate policy on the 
Trilemma Triangle, on the median axis (BF) between the fixed exchange rate policy and 
the floating regimes, inside the spot area on Appendix n°1, which groups our idea of a 
managed band with different degrees and types of management restrictions. (The 
primary benefit of an intermediate regime is that it allows policy to be directed to limit 
misalignments, which is something that cannot be claimed by either of the corner 
solutions3. As defined in the economic literature, exchange rate overvaluations are 
damaging because they lower the competitive power of the tradable goods industry, 
whereas an undervalued currency can provoke stagflation (Williamson, 2000). Therefore, 
when examining particular country cases, we should better analyze in detail the exchange 
rate behavior and its determinants in order to establish the de facto exchange rate policy 
applied by the government and its position inside the Trilemma triangle.  
 
We use the liquidity to GDP ratio (M2 to GDP) as a proxy of the monetary policy in 
defining point A4. An increase in the liquidity ratio (LIQ) will lead to an increase in 
prices and an appreciation of RER (increase in the value of RER). We use the GCON 
variable to represent an important part of the demand for both tradable and non-tradable 
goods. If that consumption was biased in favor of the non-tradables, an increase in 
GCON will lead to increase in the prices of non-tradable goods and an appreciation of the 
RER (an increase in the value of RER). If the government consumption is dominated by 
tradables, the effect of an increase in GCON on the RER is likely to be in the direction of 
depreciation. We also consider that both variables LIQ and GCON represent point A in 
the Trilemma triangle. 
 
Next, we need indicators to determine the capital flows, or point C in the Trilemma 
triangle. Capital mobility and capital controls are hard to measure, as pointed out by 
many authors (see for example Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2003, or Edwards, 
1992). The general literature takes the terms of trade, which represent the relative price of 
exports to the price of imports. For the particular case of the GCC countries, data for the 
terms of trade is only available for Kuwait. Therefore, we have decided to use the oil 
prices (OIL), since all these economies are highly oil dependant, and moreover the OIL 
series turned out to be highly correlated with the terms of trade series for Kuwait. We can 
use the OIL variable as an additional indicator of capital flows fluctuations, since an 
increase in the international price of a countrys exports, in this case an increase in oil 
prices, will lead to an increase in capital inflows.  
                                                 
3 Perfectly free float or a fixed exchange rate. 
4 Notations and detailed description of the initial set of variables are available in Appendix no2. 
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The growing degree of openness is consistent with decreasing capital controls, which in 
return creates higher possibilities for capital flows fluctuations and a movement towards 
point C in the Trilemma triangle. Therefore, to measure the degree of the countrys trade 
openness we use the variable OPEN (total trade as percentage of GDP). The increase of 
openness will lead to higher capital flows, both for import, export and investment 
concerns. Yet, the economic theory is rather ambiguous concerning the exact effect of a 
commercial liberalization, so there is not an a priori sign given to that variable (Edwards, 
1992).  
 
We also calculate and test alternatively a measure of capital flows, called CAPF, which 
represents the current account to GDP ratio, and a measure of the net capital flows 
(NKF), calculated as the balance of goods and services minus the change in reserves as 
percentage of GDP. For the purpose of our study we will consider that central bank 
interventions through change in international reserves neutralize the impact of net capital 
flows fluctuations on the exchange rate behavior. Therefore, we use alternatively two 
proxies of total reserves to GDP ratio (RES) and reserves minus gold (RESN) to capture 
the impact of the reserves on the exchange rate behavior. If our net capital inflow proxy 
is not significant, this will be due to central bank interventions and a situation closer in 
effect to point D (without meaning that the country has really imposed capital controls). 
 
We will use our variables as criteria that determine the degree of integration among the 
exchange rate policies of our sample, which will then measure the a priori likeliness for 
success of a regional exchange rate and monetary cooperation. The similarity of policy 
attitudes is an important indicator for the probability that the governments of the GCC 
countries will achieve to design an efficient policy coordination framework. 
 
The Econometric methodology 
 
From a methodological point of view, we will follow the methodology of Ibrahim 
Elbadawi (1994, 1997). We start the analysis by the standard ADF unit root tests for each 
variable, which allow us to fulfill the appropriate condition for applying the cointegration 
technique of the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step cointegration methodology with a unique 
equation, including a long-term static OLS regression and an Error Correction Model for 
the short-term dynamics.  
 
The theoretical formula defining our model is as follows: 
 
RER = f (LIQ, OIL, GCON, OPEN, CAPF, RES) 
 
For the RER index we have used 2000 as the base year. We have used directly the real 
effective exchange rate series from the WDI or the EIU database whenever these were 
provided (namely for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). Elsewhere, the RER was calculated 
following the methodology of Elbadawi (1994) as the ratio of non-tradables to tradables. 
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As expected, and in concordance with the methodology requirements, the sample 
variables that will be included in the respective models are I(1) in level and I(0) in the 
first difference (see Appendix n°3). The first step in the Engle-Granger cointegration 
method is applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to a static regression relating the levels 
of the real exchange rate and the variable that determine its behavior. 
 
The time series start in 1980, whenever available. The data has annual frequency and 
comes mainly from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank, 
completed whenever needed with data from the IFS database (2005 edition) of the 
International Monetary Fund, the Economist Intelligence Unit database (2002) and the 
statistical reports of the Arab Monetary Fund. 
 
We have used the logarithmic transformation for most data, except for the NKF and 
CAPF variables due to the presence of negative observations. 
 
logRERt = C+ β1*logGCONt + β2*logLIQt + β3*logOILt + β4*logOPENt  +  
β5*CAPFt + β6*logRESt  + β7*DUM91t + RESIDUALt  
 
As we already noted, we test subsequently two proxies of capital flows (CAPF and NKF). 
We also use alternatively the total reserves and the reserves net of gold (RES and RESN). 
To finalize this first step of the cointegration test, we shall test the RESIDUAL from the 
above regression for stationarity. If the residual term is stationary, then we could 
conclude that our variables are cointegrated. The unit root tests of the RESIDUAL term 
from the above equation, provided in the last row of Appendix n°4, imply that the real 
exchange rate and the variables from our models are cointegrated.  
 
The last step estimates a dynamic version of our model in order to verify the short-run 
effects of our variables on the RER. We confirm once again the validity of the 
cointegration relationship by the negative sign of the significant and less than one 
coefficient of the error-correction term. The results of the dynamic ECM are given in 
Appendix n°5. Finally, we use the coefficient of the error-correction term to calculate the 
speed of adjustment of the system towards the long-run equilibrium. That calculation will 
help us as well to identify the correct moving averages for each country in order to 
calculate the misalignment of the long run equilibrium real exchange rate. 
 
3. Interpretation of the econometric results 
 
In this section we will comment on the results obtained country by country.  
 
We were unfortunately unable to perform the required tests on the cases of Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates due to lack of data. In effect, CPI data for these two countries is 
only available since 1990, which allows us to calculate the Real Exchange Rate for a 
period of only 13 years. With most of the real data (GDP, government expenditure, 
exports, imports etc.) unavailable on quarterly basis, we were forced to exclude those 
countries from the analysis at the current stage of the research. 
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Commentary on the results for Saudi Arabia 
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia the variables that enter the system with statistically significant 
coefficients are LLIQ, LOIL, LOPEN, LCAPF and LRESN. The model specification 
requires the inclusion of a constant, as well as an impulse dummy to take into account the 
effects from the first Gulf war (DUM91). The model is statistically acceptable, as can be 
judged from the R², adjusted R² and Durbin-Watson statistics. 
 
The liquidity has the most important effect on the exchange rate behavior, but here it 
bears a negative sign, opposite to the one we expected. This could be explained by the 
fact that for Saudi Arabia we used the real effective exchange rate series provided 
directly in the WDI database, so its mode of calculation (tradables to non-tradables) 
might allow for the opposite interpretation of an appreciation (depreciation). The trade 
openness has also a negative impact on the long-run system, and the same effect is 
observed for the capital flows, while the reserves have the expectedly opposite positive 
effect on the behavior of the real exchange rate. The dummy is also significant and bears 
the expected negative sign, indicating that the Saudi economy is sensitive to the regional 
turmoil. 
 
The ADF test applied to the residual series from this long-run regression proves the 
existence of a cointegration relation between our variables in the long run. The error-
correction model illustrates that the lagged residual has a significant and negative sign, 
with a coefficient lower than 1, which indicates that the RER is auto-correcting toward its 
long-run equilibrium (which is the case for our four countries). More details on the speed 
of this adjustment will be given at the end of this section. 
 
In the short run, the variable that is no longer in the system is the liquidity (as will be 
seen in the other three countries), but here the NER variable enters the estimation, which 
is simply the percentage change of the official nominal exchange rate (local currency unit 
per US dollar, period average). That variable has a statistically significant, negative but 
small effect on the dynamics of the real exchange rate. This can mean that the authorities 
have adjusted the nominal exchange rate from time to time in order to maintain the real 
exchange rate close to its equilibrium.  
 
The reserves are positively and to a small extent related to the real exchange rate in the 
short run, while the capital flows CAPF are negatively and again almost insignificantly 
entering the dynamic system. The changes in the oil prices have the most relevant 
positive impact in the ECM, while the trade openness has the most important negative 
impact, meaning that the Saudi real exchange rate is adjusting to the changes of the 
volumes and prices of the main exports and imports of the country. 
 
In order to place Saudi Arabia in the trilemma triangle, we consider all the results from 
the long-term and the short-term analysis, and situate it slightly to the left from the very 
center of the figure (see Appendix n°1). 
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Commentary on the results for Bahrain 
 
The variables that enter the long-run model with statistically significant coefficients are 
the liquidity, the openness and the total reserves. The NKF and CAPF variables are level 
stationary and cannot be included in the long-run model. The government consumption 
does not enter the long-run system significantly, nor do the oil prices. The specification 
requires the inclusion of a constant and a dummy variable. The dummy is again 
significant and bears the expected negative sign, indicating that the Bahraini economy 
has been affected by the Gulf war and is therefore sensitive to the regional turmoil. The 
model is statistically acceptable, as can be judged from the R², adjusted R² and Durbin-
Watson statistics.  
 
When interpreting the short-run model results, we shall notice that the government 
consumption, that did not enter the long-run system, affects the dynamics of the real 
exchange rate, whereas the total reserves prove to be only a long-run determinant, but 
their variation as percentage of GDP (VRES) enters the system statistically significantly 
but with an infinitely small coefficient. 
 
As we can see from the coefficient estimations, the fluctuations of the capital flows 
provoked by the trade openness are almost exactly countered by the changes in the 
reserves. Therefore, the monetary policy plays the major role in the determination of the 
Bahraini long-run real exchange rate behavior over the analyzed period. Thus, we can 
conclude that Bahrain is not situated in points C or D of the Trilemma triangle, but rather 
along the CD axis, and is as well in none of the other corners, but somewhere between 
points A and B (see Appendix n°1).  
 
Commentary on the results for Qatar 
 
In the case of Qatar, the variables that enter the long-run system with statistically 
significant coefficients are LLIQ and LOIL, plus NKF and LRES. The model 
specification requires only the inclusion of a constant, as well as an impulse dummy to 
take into account the turmoil of 1991 with the First Gulf War. The model is statistically 
acceptable, as can be judged from the R², adjusted R² and Durbin-Watson statistics. 
 
The Qatari long-run real exchange rate behavior is influenced positively and most 
significantly by the liquidity of the monetary system, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
while the evolution of oil prices happens to have a negative impact on it. LRES and NKF 
have the same sign, which might seem peculiar at first, but the coefficient of NKF is so 
insignificant, that we can accept the hypothesis that the central bank has countered the 
capital flows with changes in the reserves. The impulse dummy variable is not significant 
either. 
 
In the short run, the only variable that no longer pertains to the system is the liquidity, 
which is actually present in none of the four Error-correction models. We can interpret 
this finding as assuming that the transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy do not 
allow it to exercise an immediate effect on the real exchange rate. The NKF are again 
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statistically significant and have a negative but very negligible impact on the short-run 
system, where as the reserves have the expected opposite sign.  
 
When looking at the coefficient of the lagged residual and comparing it to the other 
sample countries, we observe the slowest return to equilibrium after a shock to the 
system. 
 
In the framework of the Mundell Triangle, we position Qatars economy inside the 
triangle, close to the center of the triangle and closer to point D than to point C on the CD 
axis (see Appendix n°1). 
 
Commentary on the results for Kuwait 
 
In the case of Kuwait, the variables that enter the system with statistically significant 
coefficients are LOPEN, LGCON and LRESN. The model specification requires the 
inclusion of a constant. We were unable the include the LLIQ, NKF and CAPF variables 
since they turned out to be level stationary, which is inappropriate in the Engle-Granger 
methodology. As well, even though we were able to calculate the RER, it was impossible 
to use it for the models since it was also level stationary (around a trend). Therefore, we 
used the real effective exchange rate as provided by the EIU database. The model is 
statistically acceptable, as can be judged from the R², adjusted R² and Durbin-Watson 
statistics. 
 
The first important difference in the Kuwaiti case, as compared to the other three 
countries, is the statistical significance and negative sign for the coefficients of GCON. 
Actually, this is the only country where the government expenditures influence the long-
run behavior of the real exchange rate. This might be due to the Gulf War, when the 
public expenditures increased from around 28 to 78% of GDP. 
 
The trade openness (OPEN) and the net reserves (LRESN) have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients, which mean that Kuwaits position in the trilemma triangle is 
also along the CD axis. 
 
In the short run, only the changes in the openness and the reserves have a significant 
positive impact on the RER, which adjusts towards its equilibrium at an average speed 
compared to the other countries. 
 
With those characteristics, the Kuwaiti exchange rate policy finds its place within the 
trilemma triangle, slightly to the right from the center. 
 
The appendix figure n°1 summarizes the results for our four countries. We can see that 
they are all close to the area of the intermediary exchange rate policies. We cannot 
classify any of them neither as a de facto hard fixed nor as a completely floating 
exchange rate policy.  
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Calculation and commentary on the equilibrium exchange rates and their 
misalignments 
 
As suggested by Elbadawi (1997), we use the coefficients of the lagged residual term in 
the error-correction model in order to calculate the speed of adjustment of each system 
back to the long run equilibrium. Actually, we use the following formula: 
 
                    log ( 1- α ) 
  T   =   ----------------------- , 
                        log (1- β estimated) 
       
where T = the number of periods needed to return to equilibrium ; α = the rate of 
dissipation of the shock (here we use α: 95 %) ; and β estimated = the coefficient of the 
error-correction term. The results from this calculation for our four sample countries are 
as follows: 
 
Table 1: Speed of return towards the equilibrium 
 Log (1- 95%) = -1,3 Moving average of 
Qatar Log(1 - 0.470849) = -0.276 4.71 4 years 
Kuwait Log(1 - 0.679084) = -0.493 2.63 3 years 
Bahrain Log(1- 0.486317) = -0.289 4.49 4 years 
S. Arabia Log(1- 0.861356) = -0.858 1.51 2 years 
 
In order to calculate the long run equilibrium exchange rate, we first use the parameters 
(the estimated coefficients) from the four long-run regressions (whose results are 
presented in Appendix no4). Next, we use the above calculated speed of adjustment to 
estimate the number of periods to include in the calculation of the moving averages. The 
series obtained from these two operations are presented in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Long run equilibrium real exchange rates (in logarithm), 1982-2002. 
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As we can see, the equilibrium paths of the four real exchange rates seem perfectly 
compatible with the maintained nominal fixed exchange rate regimes. 
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Finally, we calculate the misalignment between the real exchange rate that we used as 
independent variable in the long-run regressions and the above calculated long run 
equilibrium exchange rate through the following formula: 
 
Misalignment = 100 * (RER  LRERE) / LRERE 
 
The four series are presented in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Misalignments of the exchange rates, 1982-2002. 
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What we can see from the graph is that the misalignments of each of the four exchange 
rates are really small, ranging from +1 to -1%. Moreover, the misalignments seem to 
behave similarly, with the misalignments of Qatar and Bahrain being highly correlated 
(0.577), which means that the two systems respond in a similar way to different shocks. 
 
4. Conclusion and policy recommendation 
 
The GCC multilateral cooperation agreement with its customs union and free trade area 
allows these economies to enlarge their markets, and benefit from the dynamic effects of 
a deep regional integration. Nevertheless, a deep cooperation increases the economic 
interdependence leading to contagion phenomena when a crisis occurs. This has been 
noticed clearly during the Gulf War.  
 
As we can notice from the econometric results in our research, exchange rate behavior 
determinants are different in our four countries, meaning that each country adopts a 
different macroeconomic mix. The policy harmonization that we could have expected a 
priori was not observed, even though the convergence of public expenditures, 
government deficit and monetary policy is essential to the success of a monetary union, 
as can be seen from the Maastricht criteria that govern the Euro zone. 
 
 15
The second conclusion is related to the finding of very few misalignments for the four 
countries, which are due to the use of the central bank reserves in order to neutralize the 
fluctuations in the oil prices and in any other elements related to the capital flows. 
 
By the way, it is the massive use of the important reserves that guarantees the fixed 
nominal exchange rates in these countries. This implies that the central bank 
systematically sterilizes the impact of the fluctuations in the reserves on the money 
supply. This can be a feasible policy within one single country, but within a monetary 
union framework the sterilization measures will have to be common and synchronized; 
otherwise, the evolution of the money supply in each country will be different, giving 
way to diverse inflationary pressures and also to divergent behaviors of the real exchange 
rates. 
 
The last point concerns the exchange rate policy. Since the real exchange rates in our 
sample countries turn out to be situated close to the center of the Trilemma triangle 
instead of being in any of its corners, we find it interesting for those economies to 
consider the application of an intermediary exchange rate policy for their future common 
currency. In this framework they shall target an equilibrium real exchange rate composed 
of a basket of international currencies that will guarantee the internal and external 
equilibrium of the monetary zone. This type of policy, applied successfully in Chile, is 
gaining credibility since authors like Williamson suggest it as alternative to the highly 
volatile flexible exchange rate regimes and to the fixed exchange rates that impose 
important macroeconomic constraints and require giving up the autonomous monetary 
policy. 
 
We would also like to signal, that this paper is part of a much larger research project, 
whose next steps will be to test the hypothesis that the GCC countries real exchange rate 
(RER) behaviors are cointegrated and that they share a common trend. We will perform a 
multivariate VAR cointegration analysis, following the Johansen and Juselius 
methodology (2004), aiming to identify the common driving trends shared by the six 
RER. If we are unable to solve our data problems, we will use panel cointegration 
techniques over a shorter time span. We will try to examine which currencies exchange 
rates have a transitory effect on the cointegration system, and which ones have a 
permanent impact on it. Finally, we will also use these tests to investigate on the effects 
that an external shock on one of the currencies has on the others. All these results could 
then be interpreted in terms of identifying who among Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, 
Oman and Saudi Arabia constitutes the economic driving force of the GC project, as for 
example Germany in the framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
A closely related question that we intend to address is what should be the nature of the 
monetary policy after the GC is implemented? Since the Inflation Targeting is actually 
gaining popularity, we are going to assess the pros and cons of this monetary policy and 
determine if it is recommended for the GC. 
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Appendix n°1: The economic Trilemma triangle 
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Appendix n°2: Our variables are defined and constructed as follows: 
Variable Definition 
RER Real Exchange Rate Index = The ratio of the foreign (US) wholesale price index, 
multiplied by the nominal exchange rate (NER), to the domestic consumer price index 
2000 = 100 for the index.  
GCON Government Consumption = General Government Consumption / GDP 
LIQ Liquidity = M3 / GDP 
OIL Prices of oil 
OPEN Degree of Openness = (Imports + Exports) / GDP 
CAPF [- (Exports  Imports) / GDP] 
NKF Net Capital Flows = Balance of goods and services [- (Exports  Imports) / GDP]  
Change in Gross international reserves (including gold, in current US Dollars) / GDP 
RES Total Reserves (Including Gold) / GDP 
RESN Reserves excluding gold / GDP 
DUM91 Gulf War (= 1 in 1991, = 0 elsewhere) 
NER Fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate 
VRES Variation in reserves as a percentage of GDP 
 
Appendix n°3: Results from the Unit Root Tests: 
Variable Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
LRER I(1), Trend I(1), Trend I(1) I(1) 
D(LRER) I(0)** I(0)**, Intercept I(0)**  I(0)** 
LGCON I(1), Intercept I(1), Trend I(1)  I(1), Intercept 
D(LGCON) I(0)**  I(0)**, Trend I(0)** I(0)**  
LLIQ I(1) I(1), Intercept I(1), Intercept I(0), Intercept 
D(LLIQ) I(0)** I(0)** I(0)**  
LOIL I(1), Intercept I(1), Intercept I(1), Intercept I(1), Intercept 
D(LOIL) I(0)**  I(0)**  I(0)** I(0)**  
LOPEN I(1), Trend I(1) , Intercept I(1) I(1), Intercept 
D(LOPEN) I(0)** I(0)**  I(0)**  I(0)**  
CAPF I(0), None I(1) I(1) I(0), Intercept 
D(CAPF)  I(0)**  I(0)**  
NKF I(0), None I(1) I(0), None I(0), Intercept 
D(NKF)   I(0)**    
LRES I(1), Trend I(1), Trend I(1) I(1), Intercept 
D(LRES) I(0)** I(0)** I(0)* I(0)**  
LRESN I(1), Trend I(1), Intercept I(1) I(1), Intercept 
D(LRESN) I(0)** I(0)**  I(0)** I(0)**  
Notes: 
** denotes significance at 1 percent level according to Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity statistic.  
* denotes significance at 5 percent level according to Augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity statistic.  
Lags were automatically chosen according to the Schwartz Information Criterion. 
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Appendix n°4: OLS estimations of the long-run determinants of the real exchange 
rate behavior. The dependant variable is LRER. 
 Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
Sample 1980 2002 1980 2002 1980 2003 1980 2002 
Observations 23 23 24 23 
     
LLIQ -0.203715 0.212104 -0.730742  
 (-3.379596) (4.998516) (-11.28041)  
LOIL  -0.101057 0.326621  
  (-2.117493) (5.038158)  
LOPEN -0.284443  -0.562983 0.275864 
 (-2.961633)  (-3.04917) (3.08242) 
CAPF   -0.013813  
   (-9.505655)  
NKF  -0.003366   
  (-3.733051)   
LRES 0.287416 -0.169885   
 (6.703501) (-4.908203)   
LRESN   0.223484 0.155566 
   (9.559881) (5.845403) 
LGCON    -0.141292 
    (-5.795899) 
     
C 7.038707 3.045178 8.279083 3.429156 
 (11.72523) (10.16044) (9.194749) (8.651811) 
DUM91 -0.08051 0.013181 -0.222957  
 (-2.335) (0.369875) (-3.73932)  
 
R² 0.840606 0.862089 0.976214 0.798892 
Adjusted R² 0.805185 0.821527 0.967819 0.767138 
DW 1.868877 1.606354 2.117633 1.688694 
ADF -4.290718 -4.899054 -5.054422 -4.081822 
Note: The ADF test refers to the T-statistic of the residual series from each regression. Other T-statistics in 
parentheses. 
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Appendix n°5: OLS estimations of the short-run determinants of the Real exchange 
rate behavior. The dependant variable is D(LRER). 
ECM Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
RESID (-1) -0.486317 -0.470849 -0.861356 -0.679084 
 (-3.751175) (-2.285085) (-3.648982) (-3.666995) 
D(LGCON) 0.146098    
 (3.39041)    
D(LLIQ)     
     
D(LOIL)  -0.054486 0.254206  
  (-2.432068) (4.729988)  
D(LOPEN) -0.13933  -0.472654 0.129918 
 (-3.199628)  (-3.426886) (2.049958) 
D(CAPF)   -0.004666  
   (-3.727224)  
D(NKF)  -0.001839   
  (-2.31439)   
D(LRES)  0.056559   
  (2.243204)   
D(LRESN)   0.080286 0.079189 
   (2.142478) (3.594638) 
NER   -0.032067  
   (-2.795862)  
VRES 0.001623    
 (2.229659)    
C -0.012025 0.010066 -0.021493  
 (-3.237719) (2.522345) (-2.082085)  
DUM91     
     
 
R² 0.750247 0.53399 0.775096 0.60157 
Adjusted R² 0.691482 0.42434 0.690758 0.55963 
DW 1.915021 1.688589 1.736739 1.60706 
Note : T-statistics in parentheses. 
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